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Eighth Circuit Trademark Opinions
Abstract

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ trademark jurisprudence has been truly fair and balanced since the 1946
passage of the Lanham Act. The court has created this fair and balanced jurisprudence by creating firm
standards and sticking to them. Although not the most popular circuit in which to find a trademark case, the
Eighth Circuit has kept a constant vigil to assure that trademark plaintiffs do not dominate over trademark
defendants. This balanced approach to trademark law is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court, which
recently held that “advertising injury” included trademark infringement, and therefore the defendant’s
insurance carrier had to defend a trademark infringement lawsuit against it. The Eighth Circuit appears
mindful of the need to maintain an even playing field so that trademark owners’ rights can be respected but
trademark defendants’ ability to compete is not unduly burdened. This conclusion is supported by the
heightened scrutiny of secondary meaning, the improbability of finding a trademark diluted, the strict
standard on infringement, the consistent application of the incontestability doctrine, and by the data
regarding reported success rates of trademark infringement cases. In the end, this article concludes that the
Eighth Circuit’s trademark jurisprudence will lead to further and faster economic recovery than other circuits
because the courts protect legitimate trademark rights but not at the expense of competition.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ trademark jurisprudence
has been truly fair and balanced since the 1946 passage of the
1
2
Lanham Act. The court has created this fair and balanced jurisprudence by creating firm standards and sticking to them. Although not
3
the most popular circuit in which to find a trademark case, the
Eighth Circuit has kept a constant vigil to assure that trademark
plaintiffs do not dominate over trademark defendants. This balanced
approach to trademark law is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme
Court, which recently held that “advertising injury” included trademark infringement, and therefore the defendant’s insurance carrier
4
had to defend a trademark infringement lawsuit against it. The
† Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Institute, William Mitchell
College of Law. Tony Noss ('10) provided expert research assistance on this piece.
1. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (Supp. V 2005)).
2. AL FRANKEN, LIES (AND THE LYING LIARS WHO TELL THEM): A FAIR AND
BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT (2003). (Pun intended. I teach at a law school in
Minnesota. Al Franken is now a United States Senator from Minnesota. Minnesota is
in the Eighth Circuit. I argue here that the Eighth Circuit has a balanced view of
trademark law. Maybe any pun you have to explain is not worth making.)
3. See KENNETH L. PORT, MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2008),
http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphT.pdf.
4. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579–80
(Minn. 2009).

1657

1658

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:4

Eighth Circuit appears mindful of the need to maintain an even
playing field so that trademark owners’ rights can be respected but
trademark defendants’ ability to compete is not unduly burdened.
This conclusion is supported by the heightened scrutiny of secondary
meaning, the improbability of finding a trademark diluted, the strict
standard on infringement, the consistent application of the incontestability doctrine, and by the data regarding reported success rates of
trademark infringement cases.
In the end, this article concludes that the Eighth Circuit’s trademark jurisprudence will lead to further and faster economic recovery
than other circuits because the courts protect legitimate trademark
5
rights but not at the expense of competition.
II. SECONDARY MEANING
The Eighth Circuit’s most significant role, perhaps, has been in
secondary meaning jurisprudence. The Eighth Circuit has a relatively
narrow view of this topic. Secondary meaning is an extremely
6
important concept in trademark law. Some marks are said to be
7
inherently distinctive. Examples of inherently distinctive trademarks
include marks that are coined (Kodak or Sony), or marks that use an
existing English language word in a unique and arbitrary manner
8
(Apple). Such marks are distinctive from the date of conception.
Most marks are not so lucky. Most marks consist of an existing
English word that over time comes to indicate source, but still
9
possesses the original English meaning. When such words have two
meanings, the source denoting meaning and the original meaning,
10
they are said to have secondary meaning. Words with secondary
5. See infra Part VII.
6. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001,
1005 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Co-Rect Prod., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985)) (defining secondary meaning as “an association
formed in the minds of consumers between the mark and the source or origin of the
product,” and illustrating how the question of secondary meaning is essential to
determining whether a descriptive mark warrants protection).
7. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (holding
that marks that are found to be “suggestive,” “arbitrary,” or “fanciful” are inherently
distinctive because they naturally “serve[] to identify a particular source of a
product”).
8. Id.
9. See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., 141 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the word “BLOCKBUSTER” may indicate source as a trademark, but it
also possesses multiple meanings in the English language).
10. See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 58 (Supp. 2009).
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meaning are appropriate for protection in the United States as
11
trademarks.
Each circuit has adopted its own test for secondary meaning.
Although similar, they are not entirely consistent. In the Eighth
Circuit, direct testimony from consumers or survey evidence is
important, but other factors include “the exclusivity, length and
manner of use of the mark; the amount and manner of advertising;
the amount of sales and number of customers; the plaintiff’s established place in the market; and the existence of intentional copy12
ing.”
Sometimes this inconsistency creates dispositive results, as it did
in litigation regarding the ubiquitous (in Wisconsin) cheesehead
13
hat. Ralph Bruno, creator of the so-called “cheesehead hat,” sued a
competitor in the Eastern District of Wisconsin for making a very
14
similar hat out of foam in the shape of a wedge of orange cheese.
This was precisely what Bruno had created.
15
The product had been remarkably successful for Bruno. Significant evidence existed in the record to conclude that the product had
16
been successful. However, the district court found that product
17
success alone was not “useful in establishing secondary meaning.”
18
For this proposition, the court relied on Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal,
a case from the Eighth Circuit. For this narrow proposition on
secondary meaning, the court—which is located in the Seventh
19
Circuit —reached out to Eighth Circuit precedent to find the hat
20
lacked secondary meaning, even though the relevant precedent in

11. See generally 1-2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.09 (2009).
12. Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005–
06 (8th Cir. 2005).
13. Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enter., Inc., 970 F.Supp. 676 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
14. Id. at 682.
15. Id. at 688. To anyone familiar with the rabid devotion of Green Bay Packers
fans, this should come as little surprise.
16. Id. (the hats were ubiquitous in video evidence presented of Green Bay
Packers home games, in high demand at the site of the 1997 Super Bowl in which the
Packers competed, and allegedly received extensive media attention).
17. Id. at 688–89 (quoting Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873
(8th Cir. 1994)).
18. 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994).
19. U.S. Courts, Circuit Map, http://www.uscourts.gov/images/CircuitMap.pdf
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
20. Foamation, 970 F.Supp. at 688 (holding that evidence of the success of a
product cannot “provide the basis for an inference of secondary meaning because
something other than the secondary meaning of the trade dress may have been
responsible for the success of the product”).
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21

the Seventh Circuit would have required a different result. That is,
product success could be dispositive for establishing secondary
22
meaning in the Seventh Circuit. This is just one example of many
where a court relies on an Eighth Circuit case to restrict extending
trademark rights too far.
III. INFRINGEMENT
In American trademark jurisprudence, a trademark is infringed
when a second comer uses a mark that is likely to cause confusion
23
with the senior user’s mark. Each circuit court uses a different
normative test for finding a likelihood of confusion. Although all
24
circuits’ tests are similar, distinctions remain.
The primary case in the Eighth Circuit regarding infringement is
25
SquirtCo v. Seven-Up. Even though this case has only been cited once
26
by the United States Supreme Court, SquirtCo has had the effect—at
least in the Eighth Circuit—of restraining and resisting the wholesale
27
expansion of trademark rights that one finds in other circuits.
SquirtCo is not a remarkable case. In SquirtCo, the court applied
six factors to conclude that QUIRST as used on lemonade by the
Seven-Up Company infringed SQUIRT for soft drinks used by
SquirtCo. The factors were as follows: (1) the strength of the
trademark, (2) the similarity between the trademark and the defendant’s mark, (3) the competitive proximity of the products on which
the respective marks are placed, (4) the intent of the alleged infringer
to pass off his goods as those of the trademark holder, (5) the
incidents of actual confusion, and (6) the degree of care likely to be
28
exercised by potential customers of the trademark holder.
21. See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079,
1085 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that secondary meaning is achieved if “most consumers”
have associated it with a product).
22. See id.
23. 5-5 Anne Gilson Lalonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 5.01 (2009).
24. For an analysis of these distinctions, see Michael B. Landau, Problems
Arising Out of the Use of WWW.TRADEMARK.COM: The Application of Principles
of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 520
n.71 (1997).
25. 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980).
26. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch’s Rest., Inc., 459 U.S. 916, 917
(1982) (No. 81-2012) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.).
27. Kenneth L. Port, William Mitchell College of Law, Mitchell Study on
Trademark Litigation: Graph Q (2008), http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectualproperty/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphQ.pdf.
28. SquirtCo, 628 F.2d at 1091.
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What makes the SquirtCo case remarkable is that its application
has resulted in an inherently rational infringement jurisprudence in
the Eighth Circuit, where examples abound.
In 1987, just seven years after SquirtCo, the Eighth Circuit decided
against Kellogg in its attempt to enjoin General Mills’ use of
29
OATMEAL RAISIN CRISP. Kellogg had first used and registered
30
APPLE RAISIN CRISP. Obviously, the “raisin crisp” parts of the
marks are identical. Obviously, the parties are in close competition.
However, in coming up with its rational result, the Eighth Circuit
31
concluded that the mark APPLE RAISIN CRISP was a weak mark. As
such, it deserved little protection. The Eighth Circuit showed
intellectual acumen when it also concluded that when the defendant’s
mark is very similar or even identical, it does not mean that it
32
automatically infringes the plaintiff’s mark. The court teaches that
the overall look and feel of the mark should be analyzed to determine
33
if one mark infringes another.
In this case, the lettering, the relative color schemes, and the box
34
designs all differed. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the
district court that relevant consumers could easily discern the
difference between the two marks and found that no infringement
35
occurred.
As a further example of how the Eighth Circuit reaches a balance
in the APPLE RAISIN CRISP case, the court never refers to the
trademark as “property.” Rather, the court explains, the trademark
36
“represents intangible assets such as reputation and goodwill.” The
court never uses the rhetoric of property that some courts use to
support the conclusion that the plaintiff has been harmed somehow,
37
even if that somehow might be rather nebulous.
Many courts
consider the trademark to be property and, therefore, cast the net far
29. General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1987).
30. Id. at 624 (Kellogg began marketing the product in 1983, and obtained
federal registration for the APPLE RAISIN CRISP mark in 1986).
31. Id. at 626 (holding that a mark is weak where “consumer confusion has been
found unlikely because the mark’s components are so widely used that the public can
easily distinguish slight differences in the marks, even if the goods are related”).
32. Id. at 627.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 628.
36. Id. at 625.
37. See generally Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Lanham Act: Time for
a Face Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1013 (2002) (highlighting the general
inconsistencies in judicial approaches across the circuits).
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more broadly when explaining their justification for an injunction.
The defendant, they argue, has trespassed on the property of the
39
plaintiff and, therefore, must cease. In the Eighth Circuit, this
analysis is appropriately narrower. If the right of exclusion has been
damaged, then an injunction should issue. Here, OATMEAL RAISIN
CRISP does not interfere with Kellogg’s ability (or inability) to
exclude others from using APPLE RAISIN CRISP and, therefore, the
injunction is inappropriate. All courts should be so rational.
The Eighth Circuit has not always balanced this correctly. In the
40
MUTANT OF OMAHA case, the court found MUTANT OF OMAHA
(as used on t-shirts) to infringe the insurance company, Mutual of
41
Omaha. In a case that is clear parody and, as Judge Heaney argues
in his dissent, “a significant intrusion upon the defendant’s first
42
amendment rights,” the majority seems to use the property rationale
mentioned above to enjoin the use of the mark on the defendant’s t43
shirts.
Judge Heaney is very articulate in establishing precisely why the
property rationale should not be used to justify an injunction in
44
trademark cases.
According to Judge Heaney in his dissent,
45
trademarks play a far different role in our society than real property.
Both sides in this case look to the so-called shopping mall cases, which
allow the restriction of free speech on the personal property of
46
47
another. The majority relies on this favorably. Judge Heaney
38. See Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998)
(arguing that a trademark is a protectable property right); see also New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (arguing that a
trademark is a “limited property right in a particular word, phrase or symbol”).
39. Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 24, 33 (8th Cir. 1910).
40. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
41. Id. (applying the SquirtCo analysis).
42. Id. at 406 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (holding that a “failure to protect Mutual’s
trademark rights would amount to an ‘unwarranted infringement of property rights,’
for it would ‘diminish [those] rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right
of free speech’” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))).
44. Id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that extending the definition of
“property damages” to trademark damages claims, particularly when those claims
involve “satiric appropriation,” only serves to “stifle[] creativity without protecting any
legally recognized rights” (citing H. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel,
Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 923, 964 (1985))).
45. Id. at 405–06.
46. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (citing Lloyd Corp, 407 U.S. at 567; Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)); id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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48

correctly points out that a trademark is not property. A trademark
itself is speech. When the majority states that, like the shopping mall
cases, it is acceptable to restrict speech as long as there is an alternative forum available to the defendant when the subject is a trademark,
this analogy breaks down because, by definition, there is no alternative available to the trademark as the trademark itself is the speech
49
being regulated. This line of analysis has been rather influential in
50
other “trademark as parody” cases around the country.
Many successful infringement cases in the Eighth Circuit are
51
more similar to the Kemp case. In Kemp, there was expert testimony
that LOUIS KEMP, as used on frozen wild rice meals, was confusingly
similar to LOUIS KEMP, as used on artificial crab products using
52
surimi. The court actually reversed the judgment of the district
53
court, which found no infringement. In this Eighth Circuit opinion,
the court found that “[w]hen, as here, it is shown by an alleged
infringer’s own salesman that even sophisticated professional buyers
experienced actual confusion, such evidence supports a finding that
54
confusion is likely.”
Most significantly for the question of balance of trademark rights,
the Eighth Circuit has determined that trademark infringement—the
55
“likelihood of infringement” question—is a question of fact, whereas
56
many other circuits consider it to be a question of law.
This
47. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (arguing that precedent supports the position
that the “property right” in the trademark must be protected, and should not yield to
Novak’s right to expression under the First Amendment).
48. Id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 405–06 (citing Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and
First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1111–12 (1986)).
50. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
971 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that because trademarks are comprised of words,
sounds, and images used to communicate, forbidding the use of particular words runs
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that the Lanham Act should apply “to artistic works only where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression”).
51. Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049 (8th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. at 1053.
53. Id. at 1058.
54. Id.
55. SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F. 2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
any likelihood of confusion is a factual question); see also Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 314–15 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the “clearly
erroneous” standard); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir.
1980) (also applying the “clearly erroneous” standard).
56. Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443–44
(9th Cir. 1980) (finding likelihood of confusion to be a “legal test” reviewed de
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distinction has very meaningful practical and theoretical effects.
Practically, treating the likelihood of confusion as a question of
fact means the jury’s determination on the issue will be disturbed only
if there is clear and convincing evidence that the trial court made an
57
error. Consequently, fewer appeals will succeed in overturning a
district court opinion. In the Eighth Circuit, therefore, the jury’s
58
verdict is taken more seriously than in some other circuits.
Theoretically, this approach is significant because it is a comment
on the larger and more normative role of the jury in federal trade59
mark cases. The jury will have a larger role in trademark infringement causes of action in the Eighth Circuit than in other circuits
because the ultimate conclusion on infringement is a question of fact,
not a question of law. In circuits where the likelihood of infringement is a question of law, the jury’s role is minimized to finding facts
that establish, or do not establish, each individual element of the
60
infringement analysis. In the Eighth Circuit, the jury actually weighs
the six SquirtCo factors in determining whether or not there has been
61
an infringement. As such, the role of the jury in the Eighth Circuit
is broader than in places such as the Second and Ninth circuits, where
62
infringement is a question of law.
novo); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433, 435 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974)
(observing that the appellate court is “entitled to make [its] own assessment of the
likelihood of confusion”).
57. 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
32:133 (4th ed. 2009).
58. See, e.g., Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., L.L.C., 393 F.3d 755,
760 (8th Cir. 2005) (arguing that a detailed analysis of the jury verdict with respect to
each SquirtCo factor was unnecessary, as the issue is “particularly amenable to
resolution by a jury . . . which represents a cross-section of consumers [and] is wellsuited to evaluating whether an ‘ordinary consumer’ would likely be confused”
(quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir.
1992))).
59. In patent law, for example, the Markman case greatly restricted juries from
having input on claim construction. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 391 (1996). In the patent context, I am not commenting on whether this is
a good development or a bad development. In the trademark context, the exclusion
of juries from what is an important societal and contextual issue (trademark
infringement) is dangerous.
60. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1509–12 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding that while the trial court’s finding of likelihood of the confusion is one
of fact, the court reviews the ultimate weighing of each factor de novo).
61. Everest Capital Ltd., 393 F.3d at 759–60.
62. The issue of what is the appropriate standard of review remains contentious.
One commentator points out that even the legislative history of the Lanham Act is
not clear on this point. See Burton Jay Rubin, The Role of the Clearly Erroneous Standard
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in Reviewing Trial Court Determinations of Likelihood
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For these reasons, SquirtCo has had a meaningful and lasting legacy on the law of trademark infringement, both in the Eighth Circuit
and beyond.
IV. DILUTION
The concept of trademark dilution has a tortured existence and
63
Trademark infringement, by
justification in the United States.
64
definition, only happens when parties are in competition. However,
what happens when the parties are not in competition, as with, for
example, Kodak brand pianos or Buick brand aspirin?
Trademark dilution stems from the facts of a trademark case in
England in which the court found that KODAK branded bicycles
65
lessened the distinctive capacity of Kodak on photographic supplies.
Commentators rely upon this case to simply and easily crystallize the
66
apparent problem that dilutive conduct raises. In a version of this
idea, KODAK brand pianos was even used in the legislative history of
67
the United States Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996. One
theory is that these uses need to be enjoined to maintain the distinctiveness of the famous mark. To the extent there are KODAK brand
products available that are not related to camera equipment and film,
Kodak’s mark suffers.
or No Likelihood of Confusion, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 20, 35 (1984) (arguing that the
standard of review should be a question of law based on factual determinations). For
a more detailed discussion of the split among the circuits, see 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:73 (4th ed. 2009).
63. See generally David Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 531, 533 (1991) (arguing that antidilution statutes are an “overly broad
mechanism” for protecting trademark rights and grant “protection to those in least
need of it”).
64. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the
National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 271 (1985) (explaining how
trademark protection was based on unfair competition law, and was developed in
response to product sellers seeking to divert customers away from their competitors
by using the same or similar mark on their products).
65. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., (1898) 15 R.P.C.
105 (High Ct. of Justice).
66. See, e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future:
Refocusing the Analysis of a Federal Dilution Claim, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 947–48
(2005) (discussing brand dilution in the context of Eastman Photographic).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Intellectual Property
Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 4, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015) (“If a company could sell bicycles under the Kodak
name, surely another could sell pizza, another gloves, and still another desks. No
longer could one refer to ‘Kodak’ without more . . . .’).
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On the other hand, the Lanham Act is considered constitutional
because it is based on Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution—the Commerce Clause. Hence, there needs to be interstate
commerce before there is commerce that Congress can regulate.
68
There are no property rights in gross in a trademark. There is only
the right to exclude to the extent the senior uses the mark and for as
long as the senior uses the mark. Dilution upsets this balance of
rights and creates a property right in the mark itself. As such, the
69
notion of dilution is arguably unconstitutional.
Since there are only five reported Eighth Circuit cases regarding
70
federal trademark dilution, the data set is small. Some preliminary
conclusions, however, are possible. The conclusions that are available
fit the theme of this article. The Eighth Circuit has a very balanced
approach to trademark dilution rights. The best example of this may
be a single quotation from Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.:
Trademark law does not give Stouffer the exclusive right to
use a mark that consumers associate with tasty, low-fat frozen
entrees, however. To succeed on its claim, Stouffer was required to offer evidence that the “Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tasty” mark causes consumers to associate the “Lean Cuisine”
mark with something other than Stouffer’s frozen entrees.
Because Stouffer did not do this, its trademark dilution
71
claim must fail.
Stouffer’s had argued that the word “cuisine” means that a food
72
Therefore, when comparing the sound,
product tastes good.
meaning, and appearance of the marks, LEAN ‘N TASTY means the
73
same thing as LEAN CUISINE. Therefore, Stouffer argued, the
74
marks are synonymous for dilution purposes. The Eighth Circuit
rejected that argument.
68. See Kenneth Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994) (“[N]o courts have
recognized property rights to the mark itself.”).
69. See Kristan Friday, Does Dilution Make Trademarks Into Unconstitutional Patents?,
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 180 (2001) (arguing that dilution protection regimes are
unconstitutional).
70. Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., L.L.C., 393 F.3d 755 (8th Cir.
2005); Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir.
2005); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999); Viacom Inc. v.
Ingram Enter., Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh
Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 1997).
71. Luigino’s, 170 F.3d. at 833.
72. Id. at 830.
73. Id. at 830–31.
74. Id. at 832.
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The court is clearly concerned about granting any rights to the
word “lean” in gross. The court expressly rejected this by calling the
term “lean” descriptive. However, a descriptive word with as much
secondary meaning as LEAN CUISINE obviously possesses is appro75
priately protected as a strong trademark in the United States. Simply
because “lean” also has a descriptive meaning, that should not lessen
76
the mark’s protection. Luigino’s conceded, as they must, that LEAN
77
CUISINE was famous. Therefore, whether the mark is descriptive or
strong should not have been an issue for this court. By referring to
the term “lean” pejoratively as a descriptive mark, the court shows its
true feelings about dilution. This court will be very careful about
expanding the trademark right to include dilution.
Of all the trademark dilution cases the court could have relied
78
upon, this court chose to rely on Mead Data v. Toyota from the
Second Circuit. This is strange because Mead Data is the best example
of a court shying away from applying the clear language of a state
79
dilution statute to a situation that was clearly dilutive. There, Toyota
adopted the LEXUS mark in clear contradiction to Mead Data’s
80
LEXIS mark. The court made the implausible conclusion that those
two words were not similar enough to apply the New York State
81
dilution statute. That is, when the Eighth Circuit cited as authority a
case that came to an implausible outcome to avoid applying the
dilution statute, one might wonder why. What is it about dilution that
gives the Eighth Circuit so much concern that they reach to the
Second Circuit applying the State of New York’s dilution law (not the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act) in an unbelievable manner? I
suggest that the Eighth Circuit shares the Second Circuit’s concern
about dilution as expressed in the Mead Data case. It simply goes too
far as written, and to keep balance in Eighth Circuit trademark
jurisprudence, dilution will be narrowly circumscribed.
It appears that the logic of Stouffer is stretched in a similar manner as it was stretched in Mead Data to avoid applying the dilution
statute. To conclude that no rights can be obtained to the descriptive
75. See id. at 830.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 832.
78. Mead Data v. Toyota, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
79. See, e.g., Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, supra note 68, at 449–54 (discussing the Second Circuit’s
“extremely hostile” treatment of the concept of dilution in Mead Data v. Toyota).
80. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d 1026.
81. Id. at 1028–32.
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word “lean” after the parties stipulated to the famous nature of that
mark is disingenuous.
Stouffer teaches that trademark dilution will not be openly received by the Eighth Circuit. It illustrates that dilution will be closely
scrutinized because the Eighth Circuit is concerned about extending
the trademark right too far. Granting Stouffer a right in gross to the
word “lean,” as the dilution doctrine would have us do—descriptive or
not—seems to go too far for the Eighth Circuit and its sense of
balance and fair play.
An even better example of the Eighth Circuit’s focus on fairness
82
is Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises. Viacom concerned Ingram’s use of
83
the word BLOCKBUSTER on fireworks. Viacom claimed this use
diluted its trademark BLOCKBUSTER for use on movie rental
84
services. The conduct complained of began before passage of the
85
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1996. The district court had
dismissed the case on ground that application of the FTDA in this
86
case would be impermissibly retroactive.
The Eighth Circuit agreed that the case should be dismissed, but
87
expounded on the significance of fairness in our trademark system.
The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the conduct complained of by
88
Viacom was legal when it occurred. As such, Ingram, for two years,
engaged in legal conduct and even created “property” in and to the
89
BLOCKBUSTER mark as used on fireworks. That fact must be
properly balanced, the court determined, when considering the
90
retroactive application of the FTDA. The Eighth Circuit was not
convinced that the court could adequately balance those rights and
91
dismissed the case. Therefore, the dilution cases of the Eighth
Circuit also point to a very balanced trademark jurisprudence.
V. INCONTESTABILITY
Subject to some exceptions, a registered trademark is incontest-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 889–90.
See id. at 890–92.
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92

able when two factors are met. First, the registrant must have
continuously used its mark with the goods for which the mark was
93
registered for five continuous years after the date of registration.
Second, within one year after the end of any such five-year period, the
registrant must have filed an affidavit attesting to such five years of
94
continuous use as well as to current use. A mark’s attainment of
incontestable status, or incontestability, is “conclusive evidence of the
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of
the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s
95
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.”
Incontestability in trademark jurisprudence differs from circuit to
96
circuit. The Eighth Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit in that
incontestability confers important rights on and to the trademark
holder, but this has no bearing on the strength of the mark analysis
97
for purposes of whether a mark is infringed.
All circuits recognize the clear language of section 33 of the Lan98
ham Act. That is, all circuits find incontestability to mean that the
registration is conclusive evidence of the holder’s exclusive rights to
99
use the mark on the identified goods. The circuits are split on
whether incontestable status affects the strength of the mark analysis.
In the Eleventh Circuit, an incontestable mark is presumed strong for
100
purposes of infringement analysis. In the Eighth Circuit, incontestable status is important, but is less significant than in the Eleventh
Circuit.
One example of its importance is an interesting procedural advantage in obtaining incontestable status. One panel in the Eighth
Circuit has held that filing a Section 15 Affidavit with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and changing the status of
92. See Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2008).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
96. Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV.
519, 548–52 (1993).
97. Id. at 551 (citing Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc. 909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1990)).
98. Under section 33, incontestable status is “conclusive evidence of the validity
of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce.” Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2008).
99. See id.
100. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, supra note 96, at 550 (citing
Dieter v. B&H Indus. of Sw. Fla., 880 F.2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 950 (1990)).
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the mark from a contestable to an incontestable mark is such a
significant change of circumstances that issue preclusion would not
101
bar a plaintiff from suing a defendant twice for the same conduct.
In this case, the plaintiff had sued and lost a trademark infringement
cause of action because its mark, SEALTITE, was determined to be
102
merely descriptive. Subsequent to that decision, the plaintiff’s mark
became incontestable and it sued the defendant a second time for the
same use. The Eighth Circuit held:
Here, we are not concerned with the mere passage of time.
Instead, we are faced with a question of whether a change in
a mark’s validity from contestable to incontestable bars application of collateral estoppel. We hold that this constitutes
a significant intervening factual change, and, therefore, ap103
plication of collateral estoppel is inappropriate.
It is not clear from the case that the Eighth Circuit is aware of
how simple it is to obtain incontestable status with the PTO. One
104
105
merely files a Section 15 Affidavit. It is not substantively reviewed.
106
The claim of continued use is presumed to be accurate. In this case,
107
the defendant had conceded that the mark was incontestable. The
Eighth Circuit’s opinion gives holders of contestable marks who face a
determination that their mark is descriptive and unenforceable two
108
bites at the apple. Such a trademark holder is allowed to sue the
same defendant for the same conduct: once before the mark has
become incontestable and once after. All this based on a very simple

101. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 2009).
102. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.
2001).
103. B&B Hardware, 569 F.3d at 388.
104. Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006).
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. B&B Hardware, 569 F.3d at 389.
108. By merely filing a Section 15 Affidavit with the PTO, the registrant can claim
incontestability. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1605 (6th ed. 2009), available at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/. The PTO does not accept the filing or the
claim to incontestable status. Id. The filing merely perfects the right to later claim
the mark is incontestable before a court of law. Id. Therefore, there is no procedure
that a prevailing defendant can take to object to the Section 15 Affidavit while under
review by the PTO. The only time to object is during subsequent litigation that would
be allowed under the court’s ruling in the B&B Hardware case. That is, the case, once
brought by the non-prevailing plaintiff, would have to be defended against a second
time. The prevailing defendant could not rely on collateral estoppel to ward off a
second lawsuit.
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filing of one form with the PTO and paying one fee of $200.
This is an amazing advantage for a mere $200. Giving a plaintiff
two bites at the apple and casting aside the venerable notion of
collateral estoppel because of such a simple filing is an example of the
Eighth Circuit forgetting its otherwise balanced trademark jurisprudence.
VI. DATA
The available data supports the conclusion that the Eighth Circuit is a balanced venue to review trademark decisions.
Graph A depicts an interesting trend that was recognized in the
110
early 1980s in the United States in general. In the 1980s, there was
111
The rise
a remarkable rise in incidents of trademark disputes.
appears in Graph A as the peak of trademark cases before the Eighth
Circuit reached six in 1987. The rise is followed by a slow decline in
incidents of trademark litigation. This downward trend is also
112
reflected in national data. Most importantly, Graph A shows that on

Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year
109. 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(13) (2008).
110. See KENNETH L. PORT, Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year, in
MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009), http://www.wmitchell.edu/
intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphA.pdf (graphically illustrating data
based on the Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation’s data on all terminallyadjudicated, reported trademark decisions since July 5, 1947).
111. See id.
112. See id.
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Graph B: Total Infringement Claims Established/Not Established

average, approximately one trademark case a year is heard by the
113
Eighth Circuit. Just as the national trend indicated, nearly 70% of
all reported cases in the Eighth Circuit occurred after 1980 (fortythree of sixty-three cases).
Graph B shows that the defendant prevails 62% of the time in the
Eighth Circuit. The national average is that the defendant prevails
114
only 50% of the time.
Therefore, a defendant has a far greater
chance of success in the Eighth Circuit than the nation at large.
Graph C shows in very clear detail that trademark litigation in the
Eighth Circuit spiked after 1980. For the thirty-three years the
Lanham Act was in effect prior to this spike, the number of cases was
115
rather constant. After 1980, the total number of cases heard by the

Graph C: Infringement Claims Established/Not Established by Decade
113. See id.
114. See KENNETH L. PORT, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims Established/Not Established, in MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009),
http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphB.pdf.
115. See PORT, Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year, supra note 110.
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Graph D: Total Reported Claims of Infringement Per Year

Eighth Circuit rose at an astonishing rate. By decade, in the early
years of the Lanham Act, the Eighth Circuit would hear five, eight, or
seven cases. After 1980, by decade, the court heard eighteen and
seventeen cases respectively. This is more than a 200% increase in ten
years.
Also telling is that prior to 1980, trademark plaintiffs won most of
the time. After 1980, trademark plaintiffs lost most of the time. In
the 1980s, trademark plaintiffs lost twice as often as they won; in the
1990s, trademark plaintiffs lost more than three times more often
than they won. There is only data available through 2007, but this
decade and 2010 are also on track for plaintiffs losing more than
three times more often than they win.
Until 1980, trademark plaintiffs prevailed more than 50% of the
time. Since 1980, trademark plaintiffs have prevailed 24% of the
time. That is, the number of incidents of trademark cases being
reviewed by the Eighth Circuit went up significantly after 1980, but
the numbers of times the plaintiffs prevailed did not.
Graph E establishes this trend by year rather than by decade.
Until the 1980s, there was relative symmetry in the win/lose ratio.
After 1980, the data becomes significantly skewed in favor of trademark plaintiffs losing.
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Graph E: Infringement Claims Established or Not Established Per Year

Graph F: Percentage of Injunction Claims Granted or Denied

Graph F shows that trademark plaintiffs who demand an injunction succeed more often than trademark plaintiffs who claim
infringement. Forty-one percent of trademark plaintiffs receive their
injunction when reviewed by the Eighth Circuit compared to 24% of
trademark infringement plaintiffs. Graph G depicts this trend by
decade. Once again, we see, just as in the trademark infringement
data, that the number of demands increased post-1980, but the
number of times the trademark plaintiff prevailed in obtaining the
injunction did not. Graph H depicts this by year. Once again, there
is a huge spike in the number of claims in the 1980s and a precipitous
drop off of claims in recent years. In fact, since 2000, not a single
reported trademark case demanded an injunction.
Graph J shows that there have been only three cases where damages have been received in the sixty-year history of the Lanham Act in
the Eighth Circuit. Even though a mere 4.9% of all cases reported are
in the Eighth Circuit, this percentage is very close to the national
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Graph G: Claims for an Injunction Granted/Denied by Decade
116

average of all cases. Graph J also shows that a significant award of
damages is truly rare. In 1981, one reported case affirmed a finding
of over $3 million in damages. The other two awards were for $7500
and $250,000. Therefore, significant damage awards in the Eighth
Circuit seem to be truly rare.
From an overall perspective, several conclusions seem possible
regarding the data of trademark litigation in the Eighth Circuit. First,
and most obviously, the Eighth Circuit is perfectly normal compared
to the nation regarding both the frequency of damage awards and the
amount of damage awards. Second, the Eighth Circuit is also on par
with the nation when it reflects a large increase in both trademark
infringement claims and demands for injunctions post-1980. Third,
compared to the entire nation, trademark plaintiffs prevail far less
frequently in the Eighth Circuit. In the entire nation, trademark
plaintiffs prevail fifty percent of the time. In the Eighth Circuit, they
prevail only twenty-four percent of the time. Therefore, trademark
plaintiffs prevail less frequently in the Eighth Circuit than in other
circuits, but when they do prevail they obtain damage awards at the
same rate as any trademark plaintiff in other circuits.

116. See KENNETH L. PORT, Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation Data Spreadsheet, in
MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009), http://www.wmitchell.edu/
intellectual-property/files/Mitchell-Study-on-Trademark-Litigation-data.xls
(containing 145 cases out of 2762 total cases with damages awarded).
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Graph H: Total Number of Claims for an Injunction Per Year

Graph J: Total Damages Awarded Per Year (Inflation-Adjusted to 2007 Dollars)
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VII. ECONOMIC RECOVERY
The Eighth Circuit’s trademark jurisprudence is measured and
rational. It is far more difficult to find a trademark infringed in the
Eighth Circuit than in the United States generally. Although the
Eighth Circuit does provide a remarkable procedural advantage to
117
trademark incontestability,
it openly addresses fairness when
118
refusing to enjoin allegedly dilutive conduct. This leads one to the
conclusion that the trademark right in the Eighth Circuit is not
dominated by large corporations. This is a circuit where large
corporations do not prevail merely because they are large corporations. Rather, the defendant’s rights, whether a large corporation or
not, are fairly balanced against the plaintiff’s rights. This has a
positive effect on competition.
Competition is, obviously, the cornerstone to the American
119
economy. It is precisely this competition that will lead the United
120
States out of recession and back into growth. This competition is
facilitated by the Eighth Circuit when it resists attempts to make the
trademark system by, for, and with large corporate players. Instead, in
the Eighth Circuit, the legitimate trademark rights are maintained.
However, extensions of the trademark right are not encouraged.
Therefore, although the data is limited, trademark dilution seems
to have had a hard time getting traction in the Eighth Circuit where
judges seem to be very hesitant to apply the dilution statute as written.
One has to wonder why. Especially when the Eighth Circuit cites the
extreme case of Lexis not diluting Lexus because the marks are not
117. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir.
2009) (holding that attaining incontestable status is a significant event such that issue
preclusion does not bar a plaintiff from filing suit twice against same allegedlyinfringing conduct). See generally supra Part V (discussing incontestability in the
Eighth Circuit and other circuits).
118. See generally supra Part IV (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s treated of dilution
claims).
119. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Davidson, Creating Effective Competition Institutions: Ideas
for Transitional Economies, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 71 (2005) (discussing America’s
long and diverse experience with competition law, and competition in general, within
a greater discussion of how competition laws may benefit transitional economies). In
particular, “as the country with the longest and probably widest experience with
competition law, America’s successes and failures provide lessons for any competition
law.” Id. at 74.
120. Lee E. Ohanian, Good Policies Can Save the Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008,
at A17 (“Will we duck a depression? We will if the principles of economic growth—
increasing the incentives to work and save, promoting competition, and fostering
economic openness—are maintained. This is the most important lesson we learned,
the hard way, from the 1930s.”).
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121

similar enough, the point becomes a bit more conspicuous. The
Eighth Circuit will not expand trademark rights that will interfere
with basic notions of competition.
122
In Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., when the court holds that
123
Stouffer does not have a monopoly right in the word “lean,” it is
saying precisely this. To allow Stouffer to monopolize “lean” would
provide an unnecessary competitive advantage to Stouffer. Trademark rights, according to the Eighth Circuit, are important tools for
trademark holders and those attempting to compete fairly. To give
Stouffer such a broad monopoly to the word “lean” would give them
more than they need to compete fairly. Trademarks, after all, should
be awarded to the entity that first uses them in commerce and which
124
consumers come to associate with that source or origin. More is not
needed. To give more would upset the fine line between exclusion
125
and monopoly. The Eighth Circuit seems to understand this. As
such, the circuit has pursued a very fair and balanced trademark
jurisprudence in the last sixty years.

121. Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing
Mead Data v. Toyota, 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989)).
122. 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999).
123. See id. at 833.
124. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (alleging an expansion of trademark rights based on
extortion-like activity as opposed to use in commerce as the Constitution and the
Lanham Act require).
125. See generally Port, The Unnatural Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, supra note 68 (concluding that the then-proposed dilution
statute, now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), would upset this fine line). “[B]ecause
there is no serious philosophical grounding for dilution and because of the practical
problems presented by section 43(c), a federal dilution statute is not only unnecessary
but also counter-productive to clear, rational consideration of legitimate trademark
concerns.” Id. at 436.

